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Realism, Rationality and Justice Byron White: 
Three Easy Cases 
Allan Ides* 
There are numerous perspectives from which to examine 
the jurisprudence of a Supreme Court Justice, and each 
perspective offers its own particular insight into the judicial 
process. I have suggested elsewhere that the jurisprudence of 
Justice Byron White can be explored effectively by reference to 
the methods and philosophy of legal realism.' This suggestion 
is premised on the utility of realism as a device for examining 
the underpinnings of a judicial opinion as well as on a 
perception that to some extent Justice White practiced the art 
of realism in his decisionmaking. I do not claim that  Justice 
White was a legal realist in the freewheeling style of Justice 
William 0. Douglas, nor would it be accurate to freight Justice 
White's opinions with all the baggage of legal realist 
philo~ophy.~ White's opinions do, however, exhibit certain 
characteristics of the realist t r a d i t i ~ n . ~  In particular, Justice 
White tended to approach cases from the facts up rather than 
from the doctrine down. The driving force behind doctrine was, 
generally speaking, not concepts, but facts and policies. 
Similarly, the legitimacy of any particular doctrine rested upon 
that doctrine's effectiveness in exposing those facts and policies 
that  percolated beneath the surface of legal controversies. 
White's approach to rationality review under the Equal 
Protection Clause provides a good example of his realistic style. 
While the traditional model of rationality review is 
characterized by a judicial deference that presumes the 
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. 
1. Allan Ides, The Jurisprudence of Justice Byron White, 103 YALE L.J. 419 
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147-227 (1990); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 3-44 
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existence of circumstances justifying the legislative 
classification being challenged, White's applications of 
rationality review did not rest on hypothetical possibilities, but 
instead required a factually supportable link between the 
legislative judgment and the challenged classification. The 
distinction is between rationalization and reasoned judgment. 
The former rests upon speculation; the latter requires a 
consideration of actual facts. Of course, the exercise of reasoned 
judgment involves something more than the application of a 
mathematical formula, and the policies animating the 
judgment are as much a part of the reasoning process as are 
the factual underpinnings of that judgment. Consistent with 
the foregoing, Justice White's equal protection opinions reflect 
an insistence upon a rational connection between facts and law 
as well as an appreciation of the policy issues at stake in the 
underlying controversies. 
Sun Antonio School District v. ~ o d r i g u e z ~  involved an 
equal protection challenge to a state's school-financing plan. 
Under the plan, the amount of financing available to a school 
district depended on the real property wealth of that district. 
The result was the creation of large disparities between the 
funding of relatively rich and relatively poor school districts. In 
assessing the constitutionality of the discrimination, the Court 
applied a standard "two-tiered" doctrinal analysis. The upper 
tier of strict scrutiny was available only to that limited class of 
cases involving either a suspect classification or a fundamental 
right. All other cases would be assessed under a minimal 
rationality test that presumed the legitimacy of government 
action. Since the Court found neither a suspect class-the law 
did not discriminate against any definable class of poor 
people5-nor a fundamental right-education was not deemed 
to be such a right6-it applied the rational basis test and 
concluded that the disparate funding rationally advanced the 
state's legitimate goal of encouraging "a large measure of 
participation in and control of each district's schools at the 
local level.yy7 The Court did not explain how the state's interest 
was rationally advanced by limiting the ability of certain 
localities t o  raise funds for education; rather, the Court seemed 
4. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
5. Id. at 18-28. 
6. Id. at 35-37. 
7. Id. at 49-53. 
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to set the facts aside in order to fully implement the policy of 
deference thought to be at the heart of the rational basis test. 
Justice White's dissent was fact-intensive and far from 
deferential. He specifically described the "major disparities in 
spendable funds" available to property-rich districts and t o  
property-poor districts and explained how the state's financing 
scheme made it impossible-by virtue of a state-imposed ceiling 
on the maximum tax rate-for property-poor districts to match 
the funds available to property-rich distr i~ts .~ He noted as well 
that the magnitude of differences could not be ignored, 
"particularly since the State itself consider[ed] it so important 
to provide opportunities to exceed the minimum state 
educational e~penditures."~ As to  the legitimacy of the state's 
interest of preserving local control over education, White voiced 
no disagreement. The question for White, however, was 
whether the financing plan rationally advanced that interest. 
"It is not enough that the Texas system before us seeks t o  
achieve the valid, rational purpose of maximizing local 
initiative; the means chosen by the State must also be 
rationally related to the end sought to be achieved."1° In 
applying that test, White looked to the reality of the 
circumstances : 
The difficulty with the Texas system, however, is that i t  
provides a meaningful option to Alamo Heights and like 
school districts but almost none to Edgewood and those other 
districts with a low per-pupil real estate tax base. In these 
latter districts, no matter how desirous parents are of 
supporting their schools with greater revenues, i t  is 
impossible to do so through the use of the real estate property 
tax. In these districts, the Texas system utterly fails to extend 
a realistic choice to parents because the property tax, which is 
the only revenue-raising mechanism extended to school 
districts, is practically and legally unavailable." 
Thus White's conclusion that the state law violated the Equal 
Protection Clause did not rely upon strict scrutiny or upon the 
sliding scale of values described in Justice Marshall's 
dissent.lz Rather, White's conclusion derived from a realistic 
8.  Id. at 64-67. 
9. Id. at 69. 
10. Id. at 67. 
11. Id. at 64-65. 
12. Id. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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appraisal of how the state financing system actually 
functioned, and the extent to  which that system could be said 
to  advance the legitimate goal of local initiative. Simply put, for 
White, a system of financing that both discourages and largely 
prevents local initiative cannot be said to  advance the goal of 
local initiative in any rational fashion. From a policy 
perspective the law was equally irrational: the promotion of 
quality education is hardly advanced by a scheme that 
precludes reasonable latitude for the financial support of such 
education. 
White's approach in Sun Antonio School District was not, 
apparently, the type to draw much academic attention. He 
discovered no suspect class and uncovered no fundamental 
right. Nor did he advocate a novel methodology for assessing 
equal protection claims. Instead, he used the facts to describe a 
reasoning process that led him to a particular conclusion 
consistent with the plain terms of rationality review. As with 
his approach to  other doctrines, rationality review was not used 
as a construct distinct from the underlying transaction or as a 
thesis of deference that exalted theory over facts. Rather, 
rationality review was used as a means of fairly and 
reasonably assessing the circumstances giving rise to the 
claimed equal protection violation. Doctrine served the facts, 
and not the other way around. The majority, adhering to the 
more traditional "hands-off approach, reversed these priorities 
in service to the deferential rational basis doctrine. 
Justice White's fact-intensive approach to  rationality 
review surfaced again in his dissent in New York Transit 
Authority v. Beazer.13 In that case, the Court upheld the 
Transit Authority's blanket exclusion from employment of all 
persons receiving methadone treatment. The lower courts had 
held that certain methadone users-those that had successfully 
completed a year of treatment-should not be included within 
the excluded class since such individuals presented no special 
employment risks. The Court disagreed. According to the 
Court, even assuming that such individuals could be gainfully 
employed without risk, the policy judgment of where to draw 
the line on employment of former heroin addicts rested with 
the Transit Authority.14 The Equal Protection Clause did not 
require the type of precision demanded by the lower courts. As 
13. 440 U.S. 568 (1979). 
14. Id. at 587-94. 
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such, the majority's approach was quite similar to that adopted 
by the Court in Sun Antonio School District, and consistent 
with that case a policy of deference promoted rationalization 
over reasoned judgment. 
Justice White's dissent began with the facts. It focused 
upon the district court's findings of fact which, White pointed 
out, were affirmed by the court of appeals as having 
overwhelming support in the evidence: 
The District Court found that the evidence conclusively 
established that petitioners exclude from employment all 
persons who are successfully on methadone maintenance- 
that is, those who after one year are "free of the use of heroin, 
other illicit drugs, and problem drinking,"-and those who 
have graduated from methadone programs and remain drug 
free for less than five years; that past or present successful 
methadone maintenance is not a meaningful predictor of poor 
performance or conduct in most job categories; that 
petitioners could use their normal employee-screening 
mechanisms to separate the successfully maintained users 
from the unsuccessful; and that petitioners do exactly that for 
other groups that common sense indicates might also be 
suspect employees. . . . I t  bears repeating, then, that both the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals found that those who 
have been maintained on methadone for a t  least a year and 
who are free from the use of illicit drugs and alcohol can 
easily be identified through normal personnel procedures and, 
for a great many jobs, are as  employable as and present no 
more risk than applicants from the general population.15 
Since the Transit Authority claimed that employability was its 
goal, the question for Justice White was whether the 
discrimination against successful methadone users bore a 
rational relationship to that goal: "The question before us is the 
rationality of placing successfully maintained or recently cured 
persons in the same category as those just attempting to escape 
heroin addiction or who have failed to escape it, rather than in 
with the general p~pulation.'"~ Given the findings of fact, 
White concluded that the only reasonable categorization of 
successful methadone users was in the general population. The 
majority's contrary conclusion was premised on the legitimacy 
of the overall exclusion of drug users; but, according to White, 
15. Id. at 602-04 (citation omitted; footnote omitted). 
16. Id. at 605. 
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regardless of the legitimacy of that policy, rationality review 
required an assessment of the precise classification before the 
Court-the exclusion of successful methadone users-and some 
reasonable showing that that exclusion advanced the state's 
interest in employability. The Transit Authority had made no 
such showing. 
As in San Antonio School District, White's approach in 
Beazer insisted upon a careful assessment of the facts as they 
related to the state's claimed goals. In San Antonio School 
District, the state's school-financing plan created a system that 
placed seemingly insurmountable obstacles in the path of local 
initiative-the purported state goal. In Beazer, the law 
categorized in a fashion that was premised upon assumed and 
factually inaccurate differences between various groups. In 
both cases, the legislative classification was entitled t o  no 
deference due to an absence of reasoned judgment on behalf of 
the legislature. A contrary conclusion would place the law 
above reality; it would exalt theory and doctrine over the actual 
circumstances to which the law was to  be applied. 
Justice White's dissents in San Antonio School District and 
Beazer provided a foundation for his majority opinion in 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, ~nc.'? At issue in 
Cleburne was a city's denial of a special use permit for the 
operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. Justice 
White, writing for the Court, declined to  fmd mental 
retardation a quasi-suspect class, but nonetheless, applying the 
rational basis standard, found the denial of the use permit 
invalid. The opinion reveals two important characteristics of 
White's jurisprudence. First, his unwillingness to define mental 
retardation as a quasi-suspect class was premised on what he 
perceived as the general impropriety of close judicial scrutiny of 
legislative choices that are based on relevant considerations. 
The trait of mental retardation was, according to  White, quite 
often relevant given the varieties and complexities of mental 
retardation as well as the need for distinctive treatment of 
some of those so classified. An elevated level of scrutiny, 
however, would place the judiciary in a position of second 
guessing relevant policy choices made by those in a better 
position t o  make such choices. 
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Next, the absence of a suspect or quasi-suspect 
classification did not permit the controversy to  trail off into the 
abyss of rationalization. Rationality review did not grant the 
city a license to classify the mentally retarded in an arbitrary 
or irrational manner. Again, the facts were of critical 
importance. The city claimed to  have relied upon four factors in 
denying the use permit, none of which, the Court concluded, 
satisfied the standard of rationality. For example, the city's 
assertion that the home would be in "a five hundred year flood 
plain"18 failed to show any rational distinction between a 
group home for the mentally retarded and other group living 
arrangements-nursing homes, homes for convalescents, 
sanitariums, hospitals-for which a permit would not be 
required.19 Similarly irrational was the city's expressed 
concern with the size of the home and the number of occupants. 
Since the city imposed no such requirements on other group 
living arrangements, "[tlhe question is whether it is rational to  
treat the mentally retarded differently. It is true that they 
suffer disability not shared by others; but why this difference 
warrants a density regulation that others need not observe is 
not at all apparent."20 Overall, the gist of White's opinion was 
that the governmental action was based on nothing more than 
irrational, rank prejudice against the mentally retarded. As 
such the denial of a use permit was an exercise of arbitrary 
power and could not stand consistent with the Constitution. 
The most surprising thing about the Cleburne decision is 
not that Justice White found the City's actions un- 
constitutional, but that the majority of the Court agreed with 
his less than deferential application of rationality review. From 
the perspective of Justice White's overall jurisprudence, 
Cleburne represents but one more example of his penchant for 
the realistic appraisal of fact and policy and of his insistence 
that the law reflect true, reasoned judgment. The Court's 
acceptance of this approach in the context of rationality review, 
on the other hand, represents a striking departure from the 
more formalistic jurisprudence of deference one usually 
associates with the post-Lochner era. 
What is one to make of these three, relatively obscure 
opinions? None of them establishes new theoretical boundaries; 
18. Id. at 449. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 449-50. 
290 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
none of them offers new doctrinal perspectives; none of them 
creates a novel model of analysis. Yet all of them provide 
powerful examples of reasoned analysis; and each of them 
demonstrates, in separate contexts, the ultimate importance of 
a realistic, fact-based jurisprudence. If a premise of legal 
realism is that law is sometimes nothing more than a 
subterfuge for the exercise of raw or arbitrary power, especially 
law stated in doctrinal abstractions, then White's opinions in 
San Antonio School District, Beazer, and Cleburne, can be seen 
as exemplars of legal realism's challenge to law as so 
constructed. Indeed, his opinion for the Court in Cleburne 
appears to incorporate, as part of the equal protection 
guarantee, the method of realism that  exposes legal 
abstractions and thereby uncovers the mask of the law. The 
method is, of course, the phil~sophy.~' As so conceived, 
rationality review is neither more nor less than a judicial 
technique used to determine whether the law being challenged 
is premised on reasonable, fact-based judgment or merely on 
unsustainable prejudice or arbitrary power. As such, rationality 
review, as practiced by Justice White, represents the 
quintessence of legal realism. 
21. The words of Karl Llewellyn seem apropos: "Realism is not a philosophy, 
but a technology. That is why it is eternal. The fresh look is always the fresh 
hope. The fresh inquiry into results is always the needed check-up." KARL 
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 510 (1960). Of course, a belief in "fresh 
inquiry" is itself a philosophy of some sort. In this sense, the technology of realism 
is but a reflection of that underlying philosophy. 
